Introduction
From March 2009 to October 2011, the Mexican Government applied retaliatory tariffs to selected agricultural and nonagricultural products from the United States in response to U.S. noncompliance with the trucking provisions of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Imposition of these tariffs took place within the framework of NAFTA's dispute resolution process and eventually yielded a formal agreement in July 2011 to end the lengthy dispute about whether and how to implement NAFTA's trucking provisions. As part of the July 2011 agreement, the United States and Mexico agreed to create a new program for U.S. and Mexican carriers that want to provide cross-border, long-haul trucking services between the two countries. In addition, Mexico reduced its retaliatory tariffs by half and promised to eliminate the remaining half once the first Mexican carrier was approved under the new program. In October 2011, the first Mexican carrier was approved, and Mexico withdrew its tariffs. Mexico's retaliatory tariffs provide an unusual opportunity to consider the importance of trade liberalization to U.S. agriculture. In the absence of these tariffs, all of the targeted U.S.
products qualify for duty-free treatment in Mexico as part of NAFTA. To estimate the tariffs' impact on the targeted agricultural commodities, we employ a fixed-effects gravity model of U.S. agricultural exports based on the Poisson distribution. This technique provides an econometrically sound and tractable method of estimating the tariffs' impact using monthly panel data on commodity-and country-specific export values that are highly skewed (many very large values for particular commodities and particular export destinations) and also have a large number of zero-valued observations. We estimate an aggregate model for the 34 U.S. agricultural products that were subject to the tariffs during the entire period from March 2009 to June 2011, as well as a series of commodity-specific models. The 21 agricultural products that were added to the list of retaliatory tariffs in August 2010 are not included in our analysis since the number of monthly trade observations available since that point in time is still limited.
Background
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When NAFTA was signed in 1992, the United States and Mexico agreed to allow people from either country to obtain operating authority to provide cross-border, long-haul trucking services between the two countries by January 1, 2000, following a transitional period of about 4 years (December 18, 1995 , to December 31, 1999 . During this transitional period, such operating authority would be limited to the U.S. border states for people from Mexico and to the Mexican border states for people from the United States. 3 Neither the 1995 nor the 2000 deadline was met. Instead, implementation of NAFTA's trucking provisions was repeatedly delayed, as we shall discuss below.
Institution of cross-border, long-haul trucking between the United States and Mexico is expected to lower shipping and handling costs, shorten transit times, and reduce congestion and pollution (Haralambides and Londoño-Kent 2004; Fox, Francois, and Londoño-Kent 2003) .
While short-haul trucking across the U.S.-Mexico border is generally allowed within what is called the -border commercial zone‖ in the United States and the -northern perimeter‖ in Mexico, 4 cross-border trucking beyond these areas usually requires at least three vehicles: -a 2 MacDonald (2010) provides a fascinating account of the many legal dimensions of the trucking dispute. 3 NAFTA's cross-border trucking provisions do not apply to routes exclusively within the United States or Mexico.
Indeed, the agreement preserves a U.S. moratorium on the provision of trucking services between points in the United States by persons from Mexico for cargo other than international cargo, and it reserves the transportation of cargo by truck between points in Mexico for , 2009b; Downey, et al. 2008; NAFTA Arbitral Panel, 2001 ). This latter group of carriers is referred to as -certificated‖ in reference to their Certificates of Operation. An independent evaluation panel (Downey, et al., 2008) concluded that a total of 861 grandfathered or certificated Mexican carriers with 1,749 trucks were operating in the United States beyond the border commercial zones in 2008. To the best of our knowledge, the economic impact of these operations on competing U.S.-domiciled truckers has not been documented. The initial set of retaliatory tariffs was imposed about five months after U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico experienced an overall decline due to the global economic downturn ( fig. 1A) . (2011: 19) offer the difference between the two percentages (27.1 percent) as a simple estimate of the retaliatory tariffs' impact on the targeted U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico. 
Methods
To gauge the trade effects of Mexico's retaliatory tariffs, we estimate a series of fixedeffects gravity models of U.S. agricultural exports using the Poisson pseudo-maximumlikelihood (PPML) technique suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . We selected this technique because it provides a tractable, robust, and efficient alternative to the log-linear gravity models that are commonly estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). Since some observations of our dependent variable (exports) equal zero, a logarithmic specification would require us either to drop these observations or to substitute an arbitrarily selected small number in place of the zeroes; both of these approaches yield biased and inconsistent estimators. The
Poisson (exponential) model resembles the logarithmic model in that it reduces the excessive influence of outliers in skewed datasets, but it differs from the logarithmic model in that the dependent variable is allowed to equal zero. The Poisson model has been shown to be a robust
and efficient way to model data with these characteristics, and it has the additional advantage of allowing us to generate unbiased estimates of the tariffs' impact on the expected value of actual exports, not log exports, thus avoiding the so-called retransformation problem (Duan 1983 , Manning 1998 , Mullahy 1998 , Ai and Norton 2000 .
Our model is essentially a difference-in-differences equation. Looking only at commodities that were subject to the retaliatory tariffs, we compare the value of exports to Mexico with the value of exports of the same commodities to other countries, before and after the tariff. We also control for global economic trends, the effects of seasonality, and the GDP of the importing countries. Equation (1) summarizes the specification of our model:
(1) Unlike many specifications of the gravity model, ours does not include a measure of the distance between the exporting and importing countries. Instead, we use the country-specific fixed effects to capture the effects of distance from the United States and any other timeinvariant variables (for instance, a common language or a shared geographic border with the United States) that distinguish among the importing countries. The use of indicator variables to identify pairs of exporting and importing countries (Cheng and Wall 2005) or specific importing countries (Zahniser et al. 2004 ) is a common alternative approach implemented by gravity modelers of international trade.
The PPML approach maintains the likelihood function derived from the Poisson distributional assumption but is consistent and asymptotically normal even if the data are overdispersed compared with the Poisson, as is the case here. In such cases, standard errors must be calculated using the robust estimator (Cameron and Trivedi 2010). We also absorb the country fixed-effects using within-country differencing, implemented via Stata's xtpoisson command (StataCorp LP 2011).
We first estimate this model for the total exports of 34 agricultural commodities that were subject to the retaliatory tariffs, starting about 3 years prior to the tariffs' initial imposition in March 2009 and continuing through the end of our sample period in June 2011. We refer to this model as our aggregate model. In addition, we also estimate a set of 32 models of the exports of specific agricultural commodities to study the tariffs' impact on exports of particular products.
We refer to these models as our commodity-specific models. As we shall discuss below, the U.S.
and Mexican tariff schedules do not match each other exactly, so we estimate 32 commodityspecific models based on U.S. trade data that correspond with the 34 agricultural products targeted by Mexico's initial set of retaliatory tariffs. The commodities that we examine do not include the items that were added to the list of tariffs in August 2010.
Our data set covers the period from January 2006 to June 2011 and thus is several months shy of covering the entire period when the retaliatory tariffs were in effect. Overall, the 34 tariff lines in Mexico's original set of retaliatory tariffs correspond to 32 tariff lines in the U.S. export data, so we estimate a total of 32 commodity-specific models, in addition to our aggregate model for these commodities. Table 2 , which summarizes our model results, includes a concordance between the Mexican tariff lines subject to the retaliatory tariffs and the U.S. tariff lines associated with our models.
The number of importing countries in each model depends on the number of trading partners that the United States has for that commodity and ranges from 12 (sunflower seed meal and rapeseed meal with a high content of erucic acid) to 85 (aggregate model). Among the commodity-specific models, the median number of importing countries is 62.5, and the average number is 58.5. Table 1 lists the parameter estimates and their significance levels from our aggregate model. Our main coefficient of concern-that of the Mexico tariff variable-has a negative sign and is statistically significant at the 99-percent level according to a two-tailed z-test. This means that exports to Mexico of these commodities fell in relation to exports to other countries during the tariff period, taking account of annual global trends, the GDP of each importing country, and seasonality. The next section discusses the tariff-effect estimates from the aggregate and commodity-specific models in greater detail.
Results from the Aggregate Model
The aggregate model reveals a strong and statistically significant seasonal pattern in the targeted U.S. agricultural exports, which peak in the fourth quarter of the calendar year as farm products enter the market after harvest. Mexico's seasonality pattern is significantly different from that of other countries, justifying the inclusion of the Mexico-specific month indicator variables in the equation. In particular, the difference between U.S. agricultural exports to
Mexico during the fourth quarter and corresponding exports during the rest of the year is more pronounced for Mexico than for other importing countries.
The coefficients for the year-specific indicators confirm the presence of a growth trend in U.S. agricultural exports (to all countries) over the sample period-at least for the products that were subject to Mexico's retaliatory tariffs. These coefficients are all positive and statistically significant, demonstrating that exports in each year from 2007 to 2010 were higher on average than in 2006, the excluded year for purposes of comparison. Except for the year 2009, in which U.S. agricultural exports were negatively affected by the global economic downturn, the value of each successive year indicator is significantly larger than the previous one.
The parameter estimates for the other explanatory variables-the tariff period indicator and the importing country's GDP-are not statistically significant by conventional standards.
The insignificance of the tariff period variable simply means that the year-indicators capture the bulk of the pre-tariff/post-tariff difference in total U.S. exports of these commodities. GDP's insignificance, however, is intriguing, since the GDPs of the exporting and importing countries are traditionally key explanatory variables in gravity models of international trade. Because our fixed effects for importing country broadly control for differences in GDP across importing countries, the insignificant coefficient for our GDP variable implies that within the relatively short time span (4-1/2 years) of our sample, either U.S. exports to a given country do not depend strongly on changes in that country's nominal national income, or there is simply not enough variation in GDP (or too much measurement error in the data) for that variable to have a statistically significant effect on those exports. To examine further the role of GDP in our specification, we re-estimated our models without the GDP variable, allowing the fixed-effects for importing countries to carry the full burden of accounting for the relative sizes of those countries' economies. This alternative specification generated similar parameter estimates for the Mexico tariff variable with similar levels of significance, which raises the question of whether GDP is indeed an indispensable variable in all gravity models of international trade, at least for panels covering a short period.
Estimates of Tariff Impact
The full effect of the retaliatory tariffs over the period examined is calculated by comparing the model's fitted values with its expected values, had those tariffs not been implemented. suggest that omitted variable bias may be present in these models, the fact that these commodities account for a small share of the targeted agricultural exports implies that the impact of such bias on the aggregate estimate is probably small.
We can imagine a variety of market developments that might explain these positive coefficients. For example, further expansion of the Mexican supermarket sector could lead to greater supply of imported processed foods such as prepared and preserved peanuts, while increased preferences for imported wine in general could boost Mexican demand for U.S. wine.
Similarly, in the commodity-specific models where the Mexico tariff variable garners a negative coefficient, it is possible that market developments unaccounted by the models cause some of the models to overstate the tariffs' impact, as the case of dog or cat food for retail sale illustrates. In A fixed-effects gravity model based on the Poisson distribution was used to generate these estimates. Our simple specification, which relied primarily on country-level fixed effects and year and month indicator variables, enabled us to assemble the required data and estimate the models quickly-a plus for conducting trade policy analysis in an applied setting. This simplicity in specification, however, is likely to have resulted in some omitted variable bias, which would explain the five commodity-specific models in which the parameter estimates for the Mexico tariff variable carries a positive sign, opposite of our general hypothesis. At the same time, an even simpler specification in which GDP was not included as an explanatory variable generated very similar results for the Mexico tariff variable, our main explanatory variable of concern. This outcome suggests that in some gravity models of international trade, a fixed effect for each pair of exporting and importing countries or, in our case, for each importing country-could be used in place of GDP variables, particularly when the level of trade does not vary greatly with GDP, or when GDP itself does not vary greatly over the course of the sample period.
In the future, an enhanced version of our gravity model could be used to examine the simultaneous effects of the retaliatory tariffs on trade volumes and unit values, thereby giving a more complete assessment of the impact on U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico. The impact on unit values is of particular interest, for it could offer insights into the welfare losses experienced by Mexican consumers in terms of higher prices and lower consumption levels of the targeted U.S. products, as well as the losses experienced by U.S. suppliers in terms of lower prices and lower sales volumes. Ideally, these models would include a more extensive set of explanatory variables that would account for commodity-specific market developments that influence U.S.
agricultural exports to Mexico. Sources: Unofficial author translation of Secretaría de Economía (2009 .
Tariff line Description
Notes: Trade values for the commodities targeted by Mexico's retaliatory tariffs are obtained from Mexican import data, while trade values for the agricultural commodities not targeted were calculated by subtracting the sum of the trade values of the targeted commodities, as reported by Mexican data, from the total value of U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico, as reported by U.S. export data. 
